Do Extraordinary Events Require Extraordinary Evidence?
by
G. Brady Lenardos
This paper is not about religion Yes, topics such
as the supernatural, miracles and specifically the resurrection of Jesus will
come into play, but only peripherally. This is a paper dealing with logic, with
rational thinking. There will be no calls to pray and if you began reading this
paper as a skeptic or agnostic, you will more than likely finish it the same
way. I am not writing to change your religious beliefs, but to help rid you of a
bit of logical nonsense.
As a Christian, I often get a chance to discuss many different topics with atheists, agnostics and those of other religions: The existence of God, the divine design of our universe and the resurrection of Jesus, are just a few of the major topics. While discussing these issues it seems that the same objections arise almost every time. In this paper I would like to fully address one objection that is difficult for most Christians to answer.
It is usually brought up when discussing the resurrection of Jesus as an historical event. Consider the following excerpt from a conversation that took place between an Atheist and me:
Atheist: I have had several other Christians show me the supposed evidence for the resurrection. Quite frankly, I was not impressed. After they were through, I was convinced more than ever that there was little or no evidence for the resurrection of Jesus.
GBL: I find that interesting. Would you mind telling me what criteria you used to judge the quality of the evidence, and what baseline you used to judge the quantity of evidence required to affirm that the event took place?
Atheist: As for the quality and the quantity, we both know that the claim for an extraordinary event requires extraordinary evidence, and that kind of evidence simply was not there.
The statement that is supposed to stop us in our
tracks is "claims for an extraordinary event requires extraordinary
evidence." Since this phrase could be used by an atheist, or an agnostic,
or even a deist, for purposes of this paper, I will use the word “skeptic”
to generically refer to the person who uses it.
The demand for extraordinary evidence has become
somewhat of an axiom among skeptics. You will note how this skeptic in the above
dialog adds "we both know," as if demand is a self evident
proposition. There are several reasons why this phrase has gained wide
popularity: it is short, simple and easy to remember. At first glance it looks
like a bit of sound reasoning. However, a systematic analysis of it will prove
it to be nothing but smoke and mirrors.
What does the statement mean?
If the Christian has properly framed the discussion, he has established criteria, and set up a baseline to determine historical reliability. This is the objective way to determine historical accuracy of any historical event or the reliability of any document. However, the skeptic is not satisfied in using the normal means and methods in determining claims that may upset his presuppositions. He demands something more -- "extraordinary evidence." I have found few skeptics who know what they mean when they ask for extraordinary evidence. Simply asking the skeptic to explain what extraordinary evidence is will usually put a damper on his objection. We will take it one step further and answer in a more complete fashion.
The skeptic could be asking for any or all of the following
1) A higher quality of evidence.
2) A different kind of evidence.
3) A greater amount of evidence.
Regardless of which of the above is being asked for, we must ask what objective method is being used to determine what qualifies as extraordinary evidence. How does one objectively determine how much of a higher grade of evidence is required before affirming a miraculous event happened? Where the objective scale that shows what amount of evidence is needed for regular events and how much more is required for miraculous events? Over the years I have found that the skeptic has no objective method by which to make these decisions. You will find that what is meant by extraordinary evidence is really evidence that suits the skeptic's subjective interests.
Let's look at the first possible meaning of extraordinary evidence, a higher quality of evidence. The skeptic may be asking that other tests be added to our criteria when working with miraculous events. If this is all that is meant, the Christian should have no problem with this approach and should welcome whatever tests the skeptic brings to the table, as long as he is willing to follow a few reasonable guidelines when selecting his criterion
1) The criterion must be able to be met, at least in principle. Sometimes people will make demands for evidence that cannot be met. The skeptic may ask for evidence that will prove with 100% certainty that Jesus rose from the dead. If you are unable to provide such evidence, the skeptic will then consider his unbelief justified. What the skeptic doesn't realize is that he has committed a categorical fallacy!
There are two types of reasoning that we use to determine truth: deduction and induction. Deduction deals with formal logic that produces necessary conclusions, conclusions that are 100% certain. Induction deals with informal arguments and yields probable conclusions. These are conclusions that rational people adhere to, because the rational person goes with the evidence and not against it. When dealing in the areas of law, science and history we need to use inductive reasoning. All of these areas can only yield probable conclusions. As you can see, if the skeptic demands 100% certainty, he is asking for a deductive argument. But historical investigation is an inductive process. Here the skeptic is demanding a deductive conclusion to an inductive argument. He is asking that the characteristics of the one category (deduction) be applied to another category (induction). This is fallacious reasoning and must be pointed out. This type of criterion cannot even be met in principle. If the test cannot be met, at least in principle, then it is not a real test. It is simply masquerading as a test.
2) The conclusions of the criterion cannot
conflict with known fact. It is also
improper to have a test that not only falsifies the issue at hand, but other
issues we already affirm to be true. For example, let's take David Hume's tests
for the miraculous which are found in his “Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding.” Here Hume set up a battery of
tests. In the end these tests show that no one can affirm that a miracle ever
took place. However, in Hume's own day it was shown that, given these same
tests, no one could affirm that Napoleon had been Emperor of France, or that he
had ever lived. This was an intriguing idea since Napoleon was still alive and
living in exile.
I have found that many of the methods that have been suggested by skeptics, in fact, destroy the possibility of knowing anything about history at all.
3) The criterion must be objective. In other words, the test should yield the same result, regardless of the personal opinions of those applying it. If the test only disproves the resurrection when a skeptic applies it, or only substantiates the resurrection when a Christian applies it, the test should be rejected.
4) The criterion must be one which has been used in historical research and has been demonstrated as a reliable way of determining history. I was recently reading a paper written by a skeptic. In the paper he admits that there is more evidence for the reliability of the New Testament than any other book of ancient times. However, he still rejected the resurrection because he felt there was not sufficient evidence for the reliability of the documents or the event. He listed what he considered to be sufficient evidence. At the top of the list was video tape of the event. If we could produce video tape of the resurrection of Jesus, this skeptic would be tempted to believe. Besides the obvious absurdity of this criterion, this criterion is not now, nor ever has been a criterion used by historians to determine ancient history. It is an instance of the logical fallacy "Special Pleading." It is a criterion which is set up with the sole purpose of rejecting the event at hand, an event the skeptic does not like, but is never used to evaluate other events of the period.
These guidelines may seem elementary, but the
amount of time I have spent discussing them is unbelievable. I remember one
occasion, in reference to the first guideline; a skeptic asked the question
"Why do we need to have criteria that can be met?" In other words, on
a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 lets in any and all data as evidence and 10 allows
the least and only very best data as evidence, this skeptic wanted to contrive a
criterion that would allow no evidence. Of course this is not how historical
investigation is done. But it does show the lengths that some will go to in
order not to give this particular event a fair hearing.
Let's consider the second possibility -- the possibility that another kind of evidence is needed. What other kind of evidence is there that we don't already take advantage of in normal historical investigation? What would this evidence look like? We now use the written accounts of events as evidence; what people say they saw, heard and experienced. We try to verify these things by looking for multiple testimonies to the same events. We look to see if both friend and foe confirm certain necessary aspects. We examine artifacts provided by archaeology to see if they can shed any light one way or another on the subject. Since the way we do historical investigation now requires that we appeal to what the witnesses say they sensed, is the skeptic suggesting that there is some other way besides the five senses for witnesses to know about events? Perhaps the skeptic is suggesting that witnesses use some method other than their senses as a basis for their conclusions.
If the skeptic's position is that a different kind of evidence is needed and he wants to be taken seriously, he needs to tell us what other kind of evidence there is and how we are to perceive it. He also needs to avoid the fallacy of special pleading in his explanation. I say the "fallacy" of special pleading, because in considering this question, from the skeptic's view, he assumes that not all special pleading is fallacious. I say that because the very act of asking for extraordinary evidence is indeed special pleading. He is asking us to set aside the means and methods be used for ordinary events -- events his philosophy readily accepts -- and put in its place another set of means and methods to determine if events actually happened --events that don't fit his philosophy. For the purpose of this paper we allow for it, but the skeptic needs to address the point and provide a sound reason for it. But let's proceed, as if there was a sound reason.
Finally, we look at the last possibility a greater quantity of evidence. When the skeptic asks for an extraordinary amount of evidence, there is an unexpected and underlying precondition to which he is admitting, without knowing it. At the beginning of this article, there are two propositions that the skeptic asserted 1) there is little or no evidence for the reliability of the New Testament and the resurrection of Jesus, and 2) extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Here is the question that we must ask: If it is indeed the case that there is little or no evidence to support the event in question, then why do we need to ask for extraordinary evidence? Why can't we use standard criteria and a baseline and show that there is a lack of evidence to support the claims? The chart below illustrates this point:
Let 0 on this chart represent no quality evidence at all. That is, no evidence that would pass a standard set of criteria. Let 10 represent the amount of quality evidence that would bring about virtual certainty in any matter. Let the light blue line represent our baseline. The baseline is the amount of quality evidence supporting other events of the same period that we accept as having occurred. The skeptic maintains that there is little or no evidence for the resurrection (column A on the chart). He also asks that the commonly accepted line by which we judge there to be sufficient evidence (the baseline) be raised to require more evidence. If there is little or no evidence, instead of demanding the bar be raised to 7, 8 or even higher on the chart, the skeptic should offer to lower the bar to 3 or even 2, and show the Christian how erroneous is his claim to historical accuracy. In requiring extraordinary evidence, the skeptic is unknowingly admitting that the amount of quality evidence in favor of the resurrection of Jesus is minimally equal to that needed to affirm other events of the period (line B on our chart). Once again, if the amount of quality evidence does not at least hit that line, then extraordinary evidence is not required, because the event does not measure up to a normal evaluation of historical reliability.
A final thought -
In dealing with the question of whether or not the
resurrection of Jesus can be rationally affirmed as an actual historical event,
the skeptic in our opening dialog demands that extraordinary events require
extraordinary evidence. However, the requestor is unable to objectively quantify
or qualify the nature of the evidence he is requesting. If the nature of
"extraordinary evidence" cannot be objectively quantified or qualified
it cannot be a rational request.
Overall, we find that our requestor has done little but to side track, or avoid the real issue. In seeking to avoid the issue, the skeptic has admitted, unwittingly, that the quality and quantity of evidence for the resurrection is sufficient for its rational affirmation. If the evidence isn't sufficient, then the use of a standard criteria and baseline could and should be used to show the event is not worthy of rational affirmation. It is only when an event meets the baseline with quality evidence, then the question of more evidence comes into play.
If the skeptic is willing to agree that
1) The evidence for the historical reliability of the New Testament and specifically the resurrection of Jesus is sufficient for the rational affirmation of their historicity under normal circumstances, and
2) The skeptic is able to show, objectively. that other evidence is needed, and
3) The skeptic can also show a way of qualifying and quantifying what that evidence would look like,
Then I think we should take a serious look at the suggested means and methods -- that is, as long as the suggested means and methods do not violate the above guidelines.
Until that time, the demand for extraordinary evidence is mere subjectivism.
Allow me to add just one more thought. After many discussions on this topic I have concluded that what the skeptic is really asking for when he requests “extraordinary evidence” is “just more evidence than is available.” However, it really doesn’t matter if new evidence is found, nor how much is found; for the skeptic, it can never reach the bar of “extraordinary.” For the skeptic, as the quality and quantity of evidence increases (as it has done over the years), the bar is raises by just a little more than that amount.
Consider that inductive arguments can only deliver probabilistic conclusions. By their very nature, they can never reach a point of certitude. Most of the things we know about the world around us, we know through induction. In other words, the type of evidence, the type of reasoning and the conclusions we draw all the time are done inductively. This is the way we “ordinarily” find out about reality. Therefore, for the skeptic, the evidence, the reasoning and the conclusions are not, nor can they ever be, “extraordinary.”